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Abstract 
Importance: Understanding the causes and patient impacts of surgical adverse events will help improve 
systems and operational practices to avoid incidents in the future.  
Objective: To determine the frequency, causes, and patient impact of adverse events in robotic 
procedures across different surgical specialties. 
Methods: We analyzed the adverse events data related to robotic systems and instruments used in 
minimally invasive surgery, reported to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) MAUDE database 
from January 2000 to December 2013. We determined the number of events reported per procedure and 
per surgical specialty, the most common types of device malfunctions and their impact on patients, and 
the causes for catastrophic events such as major complications, patient injuries, and deaths.  
Results: During the study period, 144 deaths (1.4% of the 10,624 reports), 1,391 patient injuries (13.1%), 
and 8,061 device malfunctions (75.9%) were reported. The numbers of injury and death events per 
procedure have stayed relatively constant since 2007 (mean=83.4, 95% CI, 74.2–92.7). Surgical 
specialties, for which robots are extensively used, such as gynecology and urology, had lower number of 
injuries, deaths, and conversions per procedure than more complex surgeries, such as cardiothoracic and 
head and neck (106.3 vs. 232.9, Risk Ratio = 2.2, 95% CI, 1.9-2.6). Device and instrument malfunctions, 
such as falling of burnt/broken pieces of instruments into the patient (14.7%), electrical arcing of 
instruments (10.5%), unintended operation of instruments (8.6%), system errors (5%), and video/imaging 
problems (2.6%), constituted a major part of the reports. Device malfunctions impacted patients in terms 
of injuries or procedure interruptions. In 1,104 (10.4%) of the events, the procedure was interrupted to 
restart the system (3.1%), to convert the procedure to non-robotic techniques (7.3%), or to reschedule it to 
a later time (2.5%). 
Conclusions: Despite widespread adoption of robotic systems for minimally invasive surgery, a non-
negligible number of technical difficulties and complications are still being experienced during 
procedures. Adoption of advanced techniques in design and operation of robotic surgical systems may 
reduce these preventable incidents in the future.  
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Introduction  
The use of robotic systems for minimally invasive surgery has exponentially increased during the last 
decade. Between 2007 and 2013, over 1.74 million robotic procedures were performed in the U.S., of 
which over 1.5 million (86%) were performed in gynecology and urology, while the number of 
procedures in other surgical specialties altogether was less than 250,000 (14%)1. Several previous studies 
on the outcomes and rates of complications during robotic procedures in the areas of gynecology, urology, 
and general surgery have been done. Yet no comprehensive study of the safety and reliability of surgical 
robots has been performed.  
Our study focuses on analysis of all the adverse events related to robotic surgical systems, collected by 
the FDA MAUDE database2 during the 14-year period of 2000–2013.	   It covers the events experienced 
during the robotic procedures in six major surgical specialties: gynecology, urology, general, colorectal, 
cardiothoracic, and head and neck surgery. We analyzed the safety-related incidents, including deaths, 
injuries, and device malfunctions, to understand their causes and measure their impact on patients and on 
the progress of the surgery.  
There have been several reports by different surgical institutions on occasional software-related, 
mechanical, and electrical failures of system components and instruments during robotic procedures3-16. A 
few studies analyzed the FDA MAUDE reports related to robotic surgical systems17-23 (see Tables 1 and 2 
in Appendix). However, most of the previous work targeted only two common robotic surgical specialties 
of gynecology and urology, or only analyzed small subsets or specific types of device failure modes (e.g., 
electro-cautery failures, electrosurgical injuries, instrument failures).  
An important question is whether the evolution of the robotic systems with new technologies and features 
over the years has improved the safety of robotic systems and their effectiveness across different surgical 
specialties. Our goal is to use the knowledge gained from this analysis to provide insights on design of 
future surgical systems that by taking advantage of advanced safety mechanisms, improved human 
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machine interfaces, and regulated operational practices can minimize the adverse impact on both the 
patients and surgical teams. 
Methods 
Data Sources 
The Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (“MAUDE”) database is a publicly available 
collection of suspected medical device-related adverse event reports, submitted by mandatory (user 
facilities, manufacturers, and distributors) and voluntary (health care professionals, patients, and 
customers) reporters to the FDA2. Manufacturers and the FDA regularly monitor these reports to detect 
and correct device-related safety issues in a timely manner. Each adverse event report contains 
information such as Device Name; Manufacturer Name; Event Type (“Malfunction,” “Injury,” “Death,” or 
“Other”); Event Date; Report Date; and human-written Event Description and Manufacturer Narrative 
fields, which provide a short description of the incident, as well as any comments made or follow-up 
actions taken by the manufacturer to detect and address device problems2. 
 
While the MAUDE database, as a spontaneous reporting system, suffers from underreporting and 
inconsistencies24,25,26, it provides valuable insights on real incidents that occurred during the robotic 
procedures and impacted patient safety. We treated the reported data on deaths, injuries, and device 
malfunctions provided by the MAUDE as a sample set to estimate the lower bounds on prevalence of 
adverse events and identify examples of their major causes and patient impacts (see eMethods for more 
details).  
Data Analysis Methods 
We extracted all the reports related to the systems and instruments used in robotic surgery by searching 
for related keywords in the Device Name and Manufacturer Name fields of the MAUDE records posted 
between January 2000 and December 2013. In addition to the structured information that was directly 
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available from the reports, we extracted further information from the unstructured human-written 
descriptions of events by natural language parsing of the Event Description and Manufacturer Narrative 
fields. We did so by creating several domain-specific dictionaries (e.g., for patient complications, surgery 
types, surgical instruments, and malfunction types) and pattern-matching rules as well as parts-of-speech 
(POS) and negation taggers to interpret the semantics of the event descriptions (Figure 1 in Appendix). 
The results generated by the automated analysis tools were manually reviewed for accuracy and validity. 
We extracted the following information: 
• Patient injury (such as burns, cuts, or damage to organs) and death events that were reported 
under another Event Type, such as “Malfunction” or “Other”. 
• Surgical specialty and type of robotic procedure during which the adverse events occurred. 
• Major types of device or instrument malfunctions (e.g., falling of burnt/broken pieces of 
instruments into patients’ bodies or electrical arcing of instruments) 
• Adverse events that caused an interruption in the progress of surgery, by leading the surgical team 
to troubleshoot technical problems (e.g., restarting the system), convert the procedure to non-
robotic surgical approaches (such as laparoscopy or open surgery), or abort the procedure and 
reschedule it to a later time.  
We compared the number of adverse events (in general) and injury/death events and procedure 
conversions (in particular) per 100,000 procedures across different surgical specialties. The rate of events 
was estimated by dividing the number of adverse events that occurred in each year (based on the Event 
Date) by the annual number of robotic procedures performed in the U.S. The total number of procedures 
per year was extracted from the device manufacturer’s reports1,27 for 2004–2013 (see Figure 2 in 
Appendix). The annual number of procedures per surgical specialty was available only for gynecology, 
urology, and general surgery after 2007. So we estimated a combined annual number of procedures for 
cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery by assuming that the majority of the remaining procedures 
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(other than genecology, urology, and general) were related to these specialties, as, according to the 
manufacturer reports, they are the only other specialties for which the robot has been used1. 
We assumed that the rate of underreporting for injury and death events are low and are independent from 
the type of surgery, because the device manufacturers are required and monitored by the FDA to report 
serious injury and death events to the MAUDE database. However, due to possible changes in the 
reporting rates during the years, the total number of events per procedure in the whole study period was 
compared across different surgical specialties. The 2-sided P values (< 0.05) and 95% confidence 
intervals were used to determine the statistical significance of the results.  
To characterize the major causes to which injury and death events were attributed, we performed a 
manual review of event descriptions for all the reports made before 2013. The cumulative number of 
malfunctions per procedure was used to evaluate the trends in malfunction rates over 2004–2013.  
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Results  
We extracted a total of 10,624 events related to the robotic systems and instruments, reported over 2000–
2013. About 98% of the events were reported by device manufacturers and distributors, and the rest (2%) 
were voluntary reports.  
Data included 1,535 (14.4%) adverse events with significant negative patient impacts, including injuries 
(1,391 cases) and deaths (144 cases), and over 8,061 (75.9%) device malfunctions.  For the rest of the 
events (1,028 cases), the Event Type information either was not available or was indicated as “Other.” We 
identified 160 adverse events (1.5%) that included some kind of patient injuries but were reported as a 
“Malfunction” or “Other.”  
Trends in Adverse Event Reports: Figure 1 shows the overall trends in the annual numbers of reports and 
the estimated rates of events per 100,000 procedures over 2004–2013: 
• The absolute number of reports has significantly increased (about 32 times) since 2006, reaching 
58 deaths, 938 patient injuries, and 4,124 malfunctions in 2013.  
• While the annual average number of adverse events was about 550 per 100,000 procedures (95% 
confidence interval (CI), 410–700) between 2004 and 2011, in 2013 it peaked at about 1,000 
events per 100,000 procedures.  
• The numbers of injury and death events per procedure have stayed relatively constant since 2007 
(mean=83.4, 95% CI, 74.2–92.7). 
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Figure 1. Annual Numbers of Adverse Event Reports and Rates of Events per Procedure 
The left Y-axis corresponds to the bars showing the absolute numbers of adverse events (based on the year that 
reports were received by the FDA). The right Y-axis corresponds to the trend lines showing (in logarithmic scale) 
the annual number of adverse events per 100,000 procedures (based on the year the events occurred). Numbers on 
the bars indicate number of deaths reported per year. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the 
proportion estimates. Because of the small number of injury and death events reported for 2004 and 2005, a 
combined rate was calculated for 2004–2006. Note that of all the events, 40 were reported as part of the articles or 
the legal disputes received by the manufacturing company. 
 
Adverse Events across Different Surgical Specialties: Table 1 shows the numbers of adverse events 
reported in different surgical specialties and their impact on patients (injuries or deaths) and progress of 
surgery (procedure conversion or rescheduling). The last row shows examples of the most common types 
of procedures reported in each specialty.  
• The majority of reports were related to gynecology (30.1%), urology (14.7%), and cardiothoracic 
(3.7%) surgeries, such as hysterectomy (2,331), prostatectomy (1,291), and thoracic (110) 
procedures, respectively.  
• Cardiothoracic and head and neck surgeries involved a higher number of deaths per adverse event 
report (6.4% and 19.7%) than gynecology and urology (1.4 and 1.9%).  
• The highest number of procedure conversions per adverse event was for cardiothoracic (16.8%) 
and urology (13.5%), and the highest rates of procedure rescheduling were for urology (9.5%), 
general (3.0%), and cardiothoracic (2.8%) surgeries. 
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Table 1. Adverse events in different surgical specialties:  
Deaths, injuries, malfunctions, procedure conversion or rescheduling, common types of surgery 
 No. (%) [95% Confidence Interval]   
 Gynecology Urology Cardiothoracic Head & Neck Colorectal General N/A 
Overall a 
3,194 
(30.1) 
[29.2–31.0] 
1,565 
(14.7) 
[14.0–15.4] 
393 
(3.7) 
[3.3–4.1] 
71 
(0.7) 
[0.5–0.9] 
301 
(2.8) 
[2.5–3.1] 
197 
(1.9) 
[1.6–2.2] 
4,903 
(46.2) 
[45.3–47.1] 
Event Type b        
 Death 
46 
(1.4) 
[1.0–1.8] 
30 
(1.9) 
[1.2–2.6] 
25 
(6.4) 
[4.0–8.8] 
14 
(19.7) 
[10.4–29.0] 
11 
(3.7) 
[1.6–5.8] 
11 
(5.6) 
[2.4–8.8] 
7 
(0.1) 
[0.0–0.2] 
 Injury 
818 
(25.6) 
[24.1–27.1] 
272 
(17.4) 
[15.5–19.3] 
64 
(16.3) 
[12.6–20.0] 
14 
(19.7) 
[10.4–29.0] 
58 
(19.3) 
[14.8–23.8] 
56 
(28.4) 
[22.1–34.7] 
109 
(2.2) 
[1.8–2.6] 
 Malfunction 
2,103 
(65.8) 
[64.2–67.4] 
902 
(57.6) 
[55.2–60.0] 
226 
(57.5) 
[52.6–62.4]  
35 
(49.3) 
[37.7–60.9] 
209 
(69.4) 
[64.2–74.6] 
110 
(57.8) 
[48.9–62.7] 
4,476 
(91.3) 
[90.5–92.1] 
 Other 
227 
(7.1) 
[6.2–8.0] 
361 
(23.1) 
[21.0–25.2] 
78 
(19.8) 
[15.9–23.8] 
8 
(11.3) 
[3.9–18.7] 
23 
(7.6) 
[4.6–10.6] 
20 
(10.2) 
[6.0–14.4] 
311 
(6.3) 
[5.6–7.0] 
Conversion 
236 
(7.4) 
[6.5–8.3] 
212 
(13.5) 
[11.8–15.2] 
66 
(16.8) 
[13.1–20.5] 
6 
(8.5) 
[2.0–15.0] 
29 
(9.6) 
[6.3–12.9] 
14 
(7.1) 
[3.5–10.7] 
217 
(4.4) 
[3.8–5.0] 
Rescheduling 
26 
(0.8) 
[0.5–1.1] 
148 
(9.5) 
[8.1–10.9] 
11 
(2.8) 
[1.2–4.4] 
1 
(1.4) 
[0–4.1] 
1 
(0.3) 
[0–1.0] 
6 
(3.0) 
[0.6–5.4] 
77 
(1.6) 
[1.3–1.9] 
Common 
Surgery  
Types 
Hysterectomy 
(2,331) 
Prostatectomy 
(1,291) 
Thoracic 
(110) 
Thyroidectomy 
(19) 
Cholecyst- 
ectomy 
(118) 
Hernia 
repair 
(37) 
 
Myomectomy 
(328) 
Nephrectomy 
(138) 
Lobectomy 
(67) 
Tongue base 
resection (19) 
Colectomy 
(61) 
Nissen 
fundoplication 
(34) 
Sacrocolpopexy 
(170) 
Pyeloplasty 
(31) 
Mitral valve 
repair 
(54) 
Transoral 
robotic 
(18) 
Low anterior 
resection 
(44) 
Gastric 
bypass 
(28) 
Oophorectomy 
(120) 
Cystectomy 
(48) 
Coronary artery 
bypass (23)  
Colon 
resection 
(25) 
Gastrectomy 
(15) 
a Percentages are over all the adverse event reports (n = 10,624). 
b Percentages are over the total adverse events reported for a surgical specialty. 
 
The higher percentage of adverse events reported in gynecology and urology could be due to the higher number of these 
procedures performed. 
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Of all the reports, only 5,721 (53.8%) indicated the class and type of surgery involved. However, the 
majority of reports with missing information on the type of surgery were related to device malfunctions 
and “Other” events (97.6%). In order to compare the rate of adverse events across different specialties, we 
focused only on reports related to injuries, deaths, and procedure conversions. For the majority of these 
events (92.2% of injury reports, 95.1% of deaths, and 72.2% of procedure conversions), the surgery type 
information was available and the rest (with ‘N/A’ surgical specialty) were removed from our analysis. In 
order to estimate the rate of events per procedure, we regrouped the events into four major categories of 
“Gynecology,” “Urology,” “General,” and “Cardiothoracic and Head and Neck,” according to the 
manufacturer’s reports1,27. The “General” category includes both colorectal and general specialties. 
As shown in Table 2, for cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery, the rates of injuries, deaths, and 
procedure conversions have been significantly higher than other specialties. During 2007-2013, the 
estimated rate of deaths have been 52.2 per 100,000 procedures for cardiothoracic and head and neck 
specialties vs. 5.7 in gynecology, urology, and general surgeries (RR = 9.23, 95% CI, 6.35–13.40, P < 
0.0001). Also, the rate of injuries and procedure conversions in these specialties have been 91.0 and 89.7 
per 100,000 procedures vs. 71.5 (RR = 1.27, 95% CI, 0.99–1.63, P < 0.052) and 29.2 (RR = 3.07, 95% CI, 
2.38–3.97, P < 0.0001) in the other surgical categories.    
Table 2. Comparsion of adverse events rates in different surgical specialities (2007 - 2013) 
 No. (rate per 100,000 procedures)
 a 
[95% CI]   
 
 
 
Gynecology, 
Urology, 
General  
Cardiothoracic, 
Head and Neck, 
Other 
Cardiothoracic and Head and Neck 
vs. 
Gynecology, Urology, and General 
Total Procedures 
Total Adverse Events 
1,661,891 
5,209 
74,709 
447 Relative Risk  (95% Cl)
b P Value 
Event Type      
Death 94   (5.7) 39     (52.2)  9.23 (6.35–13.40)1 < 0.0001 
Injury 1188    (71.5) 68   (91.0) 1.27  (0.99–1.63) < 0.052 
Conversion 485   (29.2) 67   (89.7) 3.07 (2.38–3.97) < 0.0001 
Rescheduling 180   (10.8) 12   (16.1) 1.48 (0.83–2.66) < 0.19 c 
a Percentages are over total number of procedures in each column. 
b Assuming that the level of underreporting across different surgical specialties is similar. 
c Not statistically significant because of the small number of samples (12) in the cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery.  	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Device and Instrument Malfunctions: We identified five major categories of device and instrument 
malfunctions experienced during procedures that impacted the patients, either by causing injuries and 
complications or by interrupting the progress of surgery and/or prolonging procedure times. Table 2 
shows the numbers of events in each category, the event types as indicated by reporters, and the actions 
taken by the surgical team to resolve the problems. The Other category includes the malfunctions that 
could not be classified in any of the classes.  
• System errors and video/imaging problems contributed to 787 (7.4%) of the adverse events and 
were the major contributors to the system resets (274 cases, 82% of all system resets), conversion 
of the procedures to a non-robotic approach (462 cases, 59.2% of all conversions), and 
aborting/rescheduling of the procedures (221 cases, 81.8% of all cases).  
• Falling of the broken/burnt pieces into the patient’s body constituted about 1,557 (14.7%) of 
the adverse events. In almost all these cases, the procedure was interrupted, and the surgical team 
spent some time searching for the missing pieces and retrieving them from the patient (in 119 
cases, a patient injury, and in one case a death, was reported). 
• Electrical arcing, sparking, or charring of instruments and burns or holes developed in the tip 
cover accessories constituted 1,111 reports (10.5% of the events), leading to nearly 193 injuries, 
such as burning of tissues.  
• Unintended operation of instruments, such as uncontrolled movements and spontaneous 
powering on/off, happened in 1,078 of the adverse events (10.1%), including 52 injuries and 2 
deaths. 
In total, 5,054 reports (47.6%) were related to breakage of different parts of the system and instruments. 
Cable, wire, or tube breakages are example causes of imaging problems at the surgeon’s console or 
unintended instrument operations.  
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Table 3. Major categories of malfunctions 
Malfunction 
Category a Description 
No. of Reports 
(% of all) 
Surgical Team Actions 
(% of malfunction category) 
Total 
Event Type b System 
Reset 
Procedure 
Converted 
Procedure 
Rescheduled M IN D O 
System 
Errors c 
- System error codes and faults 
- System transferred into a recoverable 
or non-recoverable safety state 
536 
(5.0%) 44 23 1 468 
231 
(43.1%) 
330 
(61.6%) 
133 
(24.8%) 
Video/ 
Imaging 
Problems 
- Loss of video 
- Display of blurry images at surgeon’s 
console or assistant’s touchscreen 
275 
(2.6%) 21 18 0 236 
53 
(19.3%) 
145 
(52.7%) 
94 
(34.2%) 
Broken 
Pieces 
Falling Into 
Patients 
- Burnt/broken parts and components 
- Fell into surgical field or body cavity 
- Required additional procedure time to 
be found/removed from the patient 
1,557 
(14.7%) 1,396 119 1 41 
3 
(0.2%) 
38 
(2.4%) 
5 
(0.3%) 
Broken 
Tip Covers/ 
Elec. Arcing 
- Tears, burns, splits, holes on tip cover 
- Electrical arcing, sparking, charring 
1,111 
(10.5%) 900 193 0 18 
2 
(0.2%) 
18 
(1.6%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Unintended 
Instrument 
Operation 
- Unintended or unstoppable movements 
started without the surgeon’s command 
- Instruments not working, open/closed 
- Instruments not recognized by system 
1,078 
(10.1%) 919 52 2 105 
31 
(2.9%) 
93 
(8.6%) 
21 
(1.9%) 
Other 
- Issues with electrosurgical units, power 
supplies/cords, patient-side 
manipulators, etc. 
- Other events reported as “Malfunction” 
5,026 
(47.3%) 4,962 31 1 32 
20 
(0.4%) 
41 
(0.8%) 
10 
(0.2%) 
Total 
(% of all) - All malfunctions
 d 9,382 (88.3%) 8,061 444 9 868 
305 
(3.2%) 
631 
(6.7%) 
246 
(2.6%) 
 All Adverse Events 10,624 (100%) 8,061 1,391 144 1,028 
334 
(3.1%) 
780 
(7.3%) 
270 
(2.5%) 
	  
 System Errors 
Video/Imaging  
Problems 
Broken Pieces 
Fell into Patients 
Burns/Holes in  
Tip Covers/Elec. Arcing 
Unintended 
Instrument Operation Other 
Broken 
Instruments  
(n = 5,054) 
33 
(6.2%) 
27 
(9.8%) 
1,166 
(74.9%) 
275 
(24.8%) 
400 
(37.1%) 
3,201 
(63.7%) 
clamps camera, cables instrument pieces, tips, cautery hooks tips, wires, insulation cables, tubes, wires  
a The malfunction categories and actions taken by the surgical team are not mutually exclusive, and in many 
cases two or three different malfunctions or two actions were reported in a single event. Figure 3 in Appendix 
uses Venn diagrams to depict the intersections among different malfunction categories and actions taken by the 
surgical team. 
 
b Event types as indicated by reporters: Malfunction (M), Injury (IN), Death (D), and Other (O).  
	  
c	  	  Table 3 in Appendix lists the descriptions and frequencies of the most common system error codes extracted 
from the reports. 
 
d	  	  In 1,019 of cases (10.9% of all the malfunctions), the device or instrument malfunction was detected prior to 
start of the procedure, of which in 20 cases the procedure was rescheduled to a later time and in 2 cases it was 
converted to a non-robotic approach.
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Figure 3 shows the cumulative rates of malfunctions per procedure over 2004–2013. Overall, the 
malfunction rates decreased after 2006, but the rate of cases with arcing instruments and broken 
instruments followed a relatively constant trend. The sudden increase in the rate of broken instruments 
after the middle of 2012 could be related to changes made to the adverse event reporting practices by the 
manufacturer in 2012 (mostly related to instrument cable breaks)30, as well as increased reporting of 
adverse events after concerns about the safety of robotic surgery were raised by the FDA31,32 and public 
media in early 201333,34,35.  
In total, 9,382 reports were about technical problems, including 1,104 cases (10.4% of all the adverse 
events) in which the procedure was interrupted and additional time was spent on troubleshooting the 
errors, resetting the system, and/or converting the procedure to a traditional technique, or rescheduling the 
procedure to a later time.  
 
Figure 2. Cumulative rates of malfunctions per procedure 
The rates of malfunctions per procedure were obtained for each week (see Figure 2 in Appendix for more details). 
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Injury and Death Causes: A manual review of a sample set of injury and death reports (from 2000–2012) 
was conducted. This allowed us to classify the causes indicated by reporters into three main categories: 
inherent risks associated with surgery, technical issues with the robot, and mistakes made by the surgical 
team. For the majority of death events, little or no information was provided in the reports. About 33.7% 
of the death events were related to inherent risks or complications during surgery, and 7% were attributed 
to operator mistakes. About 62% of the injury events involved device malfunctions (see Table 2), and the 
rest were related to operator errors (7.1%), improper positioning of patient or port incisions (6.3%), 
inherent risks of surgery (3.9%), or problems with grounding the equipment (1.5%)  (see Tables 4 and 5 
in Appendix). 
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Discussion 
Our analysis shows an increasing number of adverse events related to the robotic surgical systems being 
reported. As cautioned by the FDA2,31, the number of MAUDE reports may not be used to evaluate the 
changes in rates of events over time, because the increased reporting of events may be due to different 
factors, e.g., the increasing use of surgical systems1, changes in the manufacturers’ reporting practices30, 
and/or better awareness and increased publicity resulting from product recalls, media coverage, and 
litigation31. Therefore, we measured the prevalence of adverse events by estimating the number of events 
reported per procedure. We found that despite a relatively high number of reports, the vast majority of 
procedures were successful and did not involve any problems and the number of injury/death events per 
procedure have stayed constant since 2007.  
However, our analysis shows that estimated number of events per procedure in complex surgical areas, 
such as cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery were significantly higher than gynecology, urology, and 
general surgeries. Although not all the reported injuries and deaths were due to device problems, and the 
procedure conversions, of themselves, cannot be considered adverse events41,42, the estimated numbers of 
injury/death events and conversions per procedure are used as a metric to measure the difficulty 
experienced in different surgical specialties. The best that we can tell from the available data is that the 
higher number of injury, death, and conversion per adverse event, in cardiothoracic and head and neck 
surgeries, could be indirectly explained by the higher complexity of the procedures, less frequent use of 
robotic devices, and less robotic expertise in these fields. Although the use of robotic technology has 
rapidly grown in urology and gynecology for prostatectomy and hysterectomy, it has been slow to 
percolate into more complex areas, such as cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery. The limitations of 
the robotic user interface36, long procedure times37, learning curve38,39, and higher costs40 are some factors 
that may have contributed to the lower utilization of the robotic approach in more complex surgical 
procedures. For example, only a select type of robotic cardiac procedures are reported to have been 
successfully performed using the robots, such as mitral valve repair and internal mammary artery 
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harvest43,44,45. The recent experiences of highly competent robotic teams that performed multi-vessel 
coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) showed that the robotic approach may be associated with higher 
mortality and morbidity rates compared to open surgery46. 
In practice, the use of the robotic platform involves the interface of a sophisticated machine (see Table 6 
in Appendix) with surgical teams, in an area of patient care that is safety-critical. From a technology 
perspective, some of the reported events could be prevented by employing substantially improved safety 
practices and controls in the design and operation of surgical systems. Some examples include: 
• New safety engines for monitoring of procedures (including surgeon, patient, and device status) and 
providing comprehensive feedback to surgical team on upcoming events and troubleshooting 
procedures to prevent long procedure interruptions.  
• Providing real-time feedback to the surgeon on the safe surgical paths that can be taken47, by 
computing 3D models of the organs under surgery and surrounding critical tissues and vessels, as 
well as surgeon-specific modeling and monitoring of robotic surgical motions48, to minimize the 
risk of approaching dangerous limits and inadvertent patient injuries.   
• Improved human-machine interfaces and surgical simulators that train surgical teams for handling 
technical problems and assess their actions in real-time during the surgery. 
Limitations  
The results of our study come with the caveats that inherent risks exist in all surgical procedures (more so 
in complex procedures) and that the MAUDE database suffers from underreporting and inconsistencies. 
Thus, the estimated number of adverse events per procedure are likely to be lower than the actual 
numbers in robotic surgery. Further, the lack of detailed information in the reports makes it difficult to 
determine the exact causes and circumstances underlying the events. Therefore, the sensitivity of adverse 
event trends to changes in reporting mechanisms, surgical team expertise, and inherent risks of surgery 
could not be assessed here. 
Copyright © 2015: Authors.                                                                                                                                                                	  
17 
Conclusions  
While the robotic surgical systems have been successfully adopted in many different specialties, this 
study demonstrates several important findings: (1) the overall numbers of injury and death events per 
procedure have stayed relatively constant over the years, (2) the probability of events in complex surgical 
specialties of cardiothoracic and head and neck surgery has been higher than other specialties, (3) device 
and instrument malfunctions have affected thousands of patients and surgical teams by causing 
complications and prolonged procedure times.  
As the surgical systems continue to evolve with new technologies, uniform standards for surgical team 
training, advanced human machine interfaces, improved accident investigation and reporting mechanisms, 
and safety-based design techniques should be developed to reduce incident rates in the future.   
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Appendix 
 
Underreporting 
 
The underreporting in data collection is a fairly common problem in social sciences, public health, criminology, and 
microeconomics. It occurs when the counting of some event of interest is for some reason incomplete or there are 
errors in recording the outcomes. Examples are unemployment data, infectious or chronic disease data (e.g. HIV or 
diabetes), crimes with an aspect of shame (e.g. sexuality and domestic violence), error counts in a production 
processes or software engineering, and traffic accidents with minor damage [1]. An estimated prevalence of events 
based on the incomplete counts is likely to be smaller than the true proportion of events in the population. Several 
inference techniques based on binomial, beta-binomial, and regression models have been proposed for estimating 
the actual count values [2]. However, in all those techniques the reporting probability (underreporting rate) is 
assumed to be a constant parameter over time that is estimated based on the sample counts.  
 
A very similar problem exists in preliminary or pilot clinical investigations, epidemiological surveys, and longitude 
studies where the objective is to estimate any possible clinical effect of a treatment or prevalence of a particular 
disease in a population of patients, but the prevalence of events can only be estimated by selecting a sample of 
patients from the population [3].  
 
In all these situations, the prevalence of the events are estimated based on a random sample of events from the 
population, under the assumption that the sample set contains the same characteristics and distributions of the actual 
population, including those of the underreported and missing cases.  
 
Furthermore, it is often required to perform a sample-size calculation based on confidence intervals in order to 
provide a precise estimate with a large margin of certainty and to make sure that the estimated proportion is close to 
the actual proportion with a high probability [3]. Confidence intervals for the proportions estimated based on 
samples from large populations and finite populations can be calculated by using the normal approximation to the 
binomial distribution as follows: 
 
For large populations: 𝑝 ± 𝑧!!!/! 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑁  
For finite populations: 
 𝑝 ± 𝑧!!!/! 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑁 .𝑁!"#$%!"#$%!!𝑁!"#$%&'(")  
 
where N is the size of sample, 𝑝 = !! is the estimate of the proportion of events of interests in the sample and 𝑁!"#$%&'(")  is the size of population in case of finite populations [3].  
 
In this study, we estimated the prevalence of adverse events by making sure that we have a significantly large 
enough number of samples to provide confident estimates. Our estimations are obtained under the assumption that 
the characteristics and distributions of the observed events are not significantly different from those in the actual 
population and would not significantly change after including the underreported cases. We are currently 
investigating the extension of the proposed inference techniques in [1][2] to estimate the actual number of adverse 
events with considering a variable reporting probability over time. 	  
[1] Neubauer, G. and Friedl, H., “Modelling sample sizes of frequencies,” Proceedings of the 21st International 
Workshop on Statistical Modelling, 3-7 July 2006, Galway, Ireland. 
[2] Neubauer, G., Djuras G., Friedl H., “Models for underreporting: A Bernoulli sampling approach for reported 
counts,” Austrian Journal of Statistics, Vol. 40 (2011), No. 1 & 2, 85–92 
[3] Machin D, Campbell MJ, Tan S. Sample Size Tables for Clinical Studies. BMJ Books; 2008. 
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Figure 1. Data extraction and analysis flow from the FDA MAUDE database 
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Figure 2. Estimated numbers of procedures performed during 2004–2013 
 
 
 
The annual numbers of procedures performed in the U.S. for 2010–2013 were extracted from the annual reports of 
the manufacturer1. For 2004–2009, we estimated the numbers of procedures by measuring the graphs in the 
company’s investor presentations27. Whenever the estimated numbers from two different sources did not match or 
the data were available only for the total worldwide procedures, we chose the maximum number of procedures for 
that year in order to achieve a lower bound on the likelihood of events.  
 
We estimated the number of procedures per week from annual number of procedures by fitting a 4-degree 
polynomial curve (R2 = 0.999) to the bar graph of annual procedures and calculating the area under the fitted curve 
for every week.	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Figure 3. (a) Intersections among different malfunction categories, 
(b) Intersections among system resets, converted, and rescheduled cases 
 
(A total of 3,067 adverse event reports were not classified by MedSafe in any of the malfunction categories.) 
	  
(For 9,520 adverse events, no system resets, conversions, or reschedulings were reported.)	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Table 1. Summary of related work on failures of robotic surgical systems 
Ref. No. 
(Year) Surgery Types Medical Institute  
No.  
of 
Cases 
Total Number of Failures (Failure Rate) 
Types of Malfunctions Converted  Rescheduled 
Eichel3 
(2005) Urologic UC Irvine 200  
Total = 5 (2.5%) 
Software (4), Mechanical (1) N/A N/A 
Kozlowski4 
(2006) 
Radical  
Prostatectomy 
(RLRP) 
Virginia Mason  
Medical Center 
(VMMC) 
130 
Total = 6 (4.6%) 
Setup joint (2), Software incompatible (1), 
Robotic arm (1), Power-off (1),  
Monitor loss (1) 
Laparoscopic (1)  
Open (1) 1 
Borden5 
(2007) 
Laparoscopic 
Prostatectomy 
Virginia Mason  
Medical Center 
(VMMC) 
350 
Total = 9 (2.6%) 
Setup joint (2), Robotic arm (1), Camera (1), 
Power error (1), Console metal break (1), 
Software incompatible (1), Monitor loss (1) 
Laparoscopic/ 
Open (3) 6 
Zorn6 
(2007) 
Radical  
Prostatectomy  
(RLRP) 
University of 
Chicago  
Pritzker School of 
Medicine 
(2003–2006) 
800 
Total = 7  
(Recover. = 0.21%, Non-Recover. =.05%) 
Power-up failure (1), Optical malfunction 
(3), Surgeon handicap (3), Robotic arm (1), 
Camera (2) 
 
Completed (3) 4 
Fischer7 
(2008) 
Radical  
Prostatectomy 
Klinik Hirslanden, 
Zurich, Switzerland 210 
Total = 2 (1%) 
Robotic arm (2) 
Conventional 
Laparoscopic N/A 
Lavery8 
(2008) 
Radical  
Laparoscopic 
Prostatectomy  
(RALP) 
11 Institutions 
700 Surgeons 8,240 
34 critical failures (0.4%) 
Robotic arm (14), Optical system (14), 
Masters (4), Power supply/circuit (6), 
Unknown error (3) 
Laparoscopic (2) 
Open (8) 24 
Ham9 
(2009) 
Radical  
Laparoscopic 
Prostatectomy 
Yonsei University 
College of 
Medicine, Korea 
1 Case report of Surgeon’s console failure Delayed 15 min  
Kim10 
(2009) 
Urology, 
General Surgery, 
Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, 
Thoracic Surgery, 
Cardiac Surgery, 
Otorhinolaryngology 
Yonsei University 
College of 
Medicine, Korea 
 
(2005–2008) 
1,797 
Total = 43 (2.4%) 
Robot failures (24): On/off failure (1), 
Console malfunction (5), Robotic arm (6), 
Optic system (2), System error (10) 
Instrument failures (19): Shaft injuries (9), 
Wire cutting (2), Unnatural motion (2), 
Instrument tip (2), Limitation in motion (1) 
Laparoscopic/ 
Open (3) 
 
 
 
N/A 
Kaushik11 
(2010) 
Robot-assisted  
Radical  
Prostatectomy 
(RARP) 
Survey of 
176 Surgeons from  
4 Countries 
 
N/A 
Total failures = 260 
Robotic arm (38%), Camera (17.6%), 
Setup joint (13.8%), Power error (8.8%), 
Ocular monitor loss (8%), Instruments 
(7.6%), Console handpiece break (3%), 
Software (1.9%), Backup battery (0.3%), 
Instrument identification (0.3%) 
Open (18.8%), 
Laparoscopic 
(15%), 
Another robot, 
with one fewer 
robotic arm 
(8.7%) 
57.5% 
Finan12 
(2010) 
Gynecologic  
Oncology 
Mitchell Cancer 
Institute, University 
of South Alabama 
(2006–2008) 
137 
Total = 11 (8.02%) 
Robotic arm (2), Light or camera cord (2), 
Maylard bipolar (1), Power failure (1), Port 
problem (1), Others (3) 
Delayed 25 min.  N/A 
Mues13 
(2011) 
Urology, 
Gynecology, 
Cardiothoracic,  
General surgery,  
Otolaryngology, 
Neurosurgery 
Ohio State 
University Medical 
Center, 
James Cancer 
Hospital 
(2008–2009) 
454 Tip cover failures = 12 (2.6%) Significant patient complications (25%) 
 
Repaired at the 
time of surgery 
N/A 
Agcaoglu14 
(2012) 
General  
Surgery Cleveland Clinic 223 
Total = 10 (4.5%) 
Robotic instrument (4), Optical system (3), 
Robotic arms (2), Robotic console (1) 
Open surgery 
(6) N/A 
Chen15 
(2012) 
Urological 
Surgery 
Veterans General 
Hospital, Taiwan 
(2005–2011)  
400 
Total = 14 (3.5%) 
Robotic arm/joint (11), Optical system (1), 
Power system (1), Endoscopic instrument 
(1), Software incomp. (1) 
Completed (10), 
Laparoscopy (3) 1 
Buchs16 
(2014) General Surgery 
A Teaching 
Institution 
(2006-2012) 
526 
Total = 18 (3.4%) 
Robotic instruments (9), Robotic arms (4), 
Surgical console (3), Optical system (2) 
Laparoscopic (1) 
(0.2%) N/A 
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Table 2. Summary of related work on analysis of MAUDE data of robotic surgical systems 	  
Murphy et al.17 identified 38 system failures and 78 adverse events related to the da Vinci robotic system, 
reported from 2006 to 2007; most of them were related to broken instrument tips or failure of 
electrocautery elements.  
Andonian et al.18 found an estimated failure rate of 0.38% for robotic-assisted laparoscopic surgeries by 
reviewing 189 adverse events related to the ZEUS and da Vinci surgical robotic systems, reported to the 
MAUDE database between the years 2000 and 2007.  
Lucas et al.19 compared the rates of adverse events for two different models of da Vinci surgical systems 
(dVs and dV) during the period of 2003−2009 and showed that both device malfunctions and open 
conversions were reduced by increased robotic experience and newer surgical systems.  
Fuller et al.20 reviewed 605 adverse events involving the da Vinci system during 2001–2011, and 
identified 24 (3.9%) reports related to electrosurgical injuries (ESI) that occurred during gynecological 
and prostatectomy procedures. 
Friedman et al.21 analyzed the da Vinci robotic system instrument failures reported to the MAUDE 
database in 2009 and 2010. They found a total of 565 instrument failures, of which the majority were 
related to the instrument wrist or tip (285), 174 were related to cautery problems, 76 were shaft failures, 
and the rest were cable and control housing failures (36). 
Gupta et al.22 reviewed a total of 741 adverse events reported to the MAUDE database in 2009 and 2010. 
They found that 43.5% of the events were related to the use of energy instruments, that 30.97% were 
associated with the surgical systems and instruments, and that the severity of events correlated with the 
type of surgery and the type of device used.  
Finally, Manoucheri et al. 23 evaluated the adverse events reported during robotic gynecologic procedures 
and found that the majority of reported injuries (65%) were not directly related to the surgical system; 
21% were related to operator error; and 14% were due to technical system failures.  	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Table 3. Most frequent system error codes 
System 
Error 
Code 
Description 
Type of  
Safe State 
that System 
Transits To 
No. of 
Adverse 
Events 
#20008 
The angular position of one or more robotic joint’s on the specified 
manipulator, as measured by the joint’s primary control sensor (encoder) and 
the secondary sensor (potentiometer), were out of specified tolerance for 
agreement. 
Recoverable 
62 
#23008 42 
#20013 34 
#23013 20 
#21008 18 
#21013 17 
#23002 8 
#20009 7 
#22003 5 
#212 
A voltage-tracking fault reported by the digital signal processor (dsp) when the 
actual voltage to drive current through the motors deviates from the expected 
voltage by a specified amount. 
Non-recoverable 31 
#23 
Hardware wheel "wdog" has tripped on one of the digital communication links 
in the system (due to an excessive number of retries on hardware message 
packets). This means that the system cannot reliably communicate over that 
digital link and therefore cannot continue normal operation. 
Communication faults in the low-voltage differential signal carrying 
information about the patient side manipulator. 
Communication faults between two system components. 
N/A 28 
#1 A power supply voltage was out of range. Non-recoverable 19 
#3 A redundant switch was missing its ground sense, or the contacts did not report as expected at startup. N/A 15 
#23017 A motor did not respond as expected, and the measured motion did not match the internal stimulation of the motor. Recoverable 14 
#2 A reference voltage was out of range. N/A 14 
#31030 One of the camera controller units in the doco has failed to power on after multiple attempts or has shut down after initially powering up. N/A 14 
#5 One or more fans are not moving as desired N/A 10 
#297 An electronic component was reporting an incorrect configuration. Non-recoverable 9 
#252 Master supervisory controller did not receive an expected message within a specified time. Recoverable 8 
#23020 One of the switches in a specific manipulator is showing inconsistent signals on its two switch leads. Recoverable 7 
#25589 During the power up self-test, the remote arm controller board (rac) brakes failed the brake voltage test. Recoverable 6 
#25588 A sympathetic error and occurs during the self-test upon system power-up when a loop response test fails. Recoverable 6 
#23007 On startup, one or more robotic joints on the manipulator did not make the prescribed test motion to within the specified tolerance. Recoverable 6 
#21003 The arm did not perform the commanded motions during startup within a specified tolerance. N/A 5 
#281 A processor did not complete a step during system startup within the allotted time. Non-recoverable 5 
#23034 After a specified amount of time, a valid event was not seen for one of the remote compute engine switches. Recoverable 5 
#45049 A communication timeout with the software running the da Vinci onsite application. Recoverable 4 
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Table 4. Summary of death and injury reports (2000–2012) 
 
 Death Reports (Total = 86) 
Example Causes Number of Reports (%) 
 Surgeon/staff mistake 6 (7.0%) 
 Patient’s history 10 (11.6%) 
 Inherent risks 19 (22.1%) 
 N/A 27 (31.4%) 
During Procedure Punctures, bleeding, pulmonary embolism, cardiac arrest 64 (75.3%) 
After Procedure Infection/sepsis, heavy bleeding 15 (17.4%) 
Injury Reports (Total = 410) 
Example Causes Number of Reports (%) 
Device malfunctionsa  254 (62.0%) 
Surgeon/staff mistake 29 (7.1%) 
Improper positioning of the patient led to post-operation 
complications such as nerve damage 17 (4.1%) 
Inherent risks of surgery and patient history 16 (3.9%) 
Burning of tissues near port incisions 9 (2.2%) 
Possible passing of the electrosurgical unit currents through 
instruments to the patient body 6 (1.5%) 
Surgeon felt shocking at the surgeon-side console 2 (0.5%) 
N/A 77 (18.8%) 
 
a Table 5 lists some example reports on device malfunctions that impacted patients during cardiothoracic procedures.	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Table 5. Example malfunctions and their patient impact during cardiothoracic procedures 
MAUDE 
Report 
No. 
(Year) 
Surgery 
Type Event 
Faulty 
Component Patient Impact Recovery Actions 
932174 
(2007) 
Mitral  
valve  
repair 
Possibly port placement; 
The robotic arms were 
never seen to collide, but 
this could have occurred, 
resulting in pressure on the 
retractor. 
N/A 
Left atrial disrupted, 
A 3 cm tear occurred 
in the hood of atrium 
medial to left atrial 
appendage, 
extending down 
towards the mitral 
annulus. 
A patch was brought 
into place, trimmed, 
sewn using a suture, 
and tied.  
Sternotomy incision 
made for further 
repair. 
1077464 
(2008) 
Beating  
heart  
double  
vessel  
CABG 
Unexplained movement of 
the system arm with the 
endowrist stabilizer 
instrument attached to it. 
Feet at the distal end of the 
endowrist stabilizer tipped 
downward. 
System 
arm 
Damage to the 
myocardium of the 
patient’s left 
ventricle. 
Converted to open 
sternotomy and 
repaired. 
1590517 
(2010) CABG 
Micro bipolar forceps 
(mbf) instrument jumped 
forward. 
When master tool 
manipulator was moved, 
the instrument felt stuck 
and then moved. 
Patient side 
manipulator 
(psm) 
 
Patient’s artery 
punctured. 
Damaged section of  
artery was transected 
and the healthy 
portion was used to 
complete the bypass. 
Company replaced the 
psm component. 
2494890 
(2012) CABG 
Arcing from bipolar 
forceps instrument. 
Forceps 
instrument 
Small burn to 
diaphragm. 
Connected ground 
pads and checked 
electrical surgical unit. 
2816230 
(2012) N/A 
Patient-side manipulator 
(psm) arm 2 jumped. 
Patient-side 
manipulator 
(psm) 
 
The forceps 
instrument on the 
psm lacerated the 
patient's mammary 
artery. 
Converted to open 
surgery. 
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Table 6. Example complex robotic interactions with possible failure modes 	  
1) A surgeon or surgical assistant needs to be by the patient’s side, inserting the ports/scope/instruments. 
2) The main surgeon sits at a console some distance away from the patient, with no peripheral vision, 
and so does not get to see the manipulation of the arms in and around the patient. 
3) Any change of instrumentation requires a pause in proceedings, as the patient-side surgeon stops and 
changes instruments. Once the instrument is docked in the port, registered, and secured, the 
procedure can be resumed. from where it was stopped. Each of those instrument changes takes about 
30 seconds to 2 minutes, so if there are 10 instrument changes in a case, that add 20 minutes to the 
total time of the procedure.   
4) There is no tactile feedback or haptics. Several of the adverse events included inadvertent injury to 
the aorta, right ventricle, lungs, etc.  Sometimes, vessels have been ripped because of lack of feel, and 
the force delivered by the grasping forceps might significantly exceed safe limits. 
5) The endoscope’s field of vision is very limited and it can be easy to get disoriented, in terms of both 
the horizon and the location within the body.  
6) Visualization requires insufflation of carbon dioxide at a high flow of 6–10 liters/minute. While CO2 
insufflation is also done in non-robotic laparoscopy, it is usually not at such a high flow. That high 
flow of CO2 can result in absorption of carbon dioxide, which can cause significant metabolic 
derangements that affect the heart. 
7) Each instrument may be used only 10 times, after which software shutdown occurs, driving up the 
costs and making instruments part of the disposable costs. In open and non-robotic laparoscopic 
surgeries, some disposable instruments are used, but they are not as expensive as robotic instruments. 
8) There is an obligatory setup time, in addition to longer operative times with the robot.  Robotic 
procedures in all fields of surgery take longer than non-robotic (open or laparoscopic) procedures. 
 
